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PANEL DISCUSSION
(The following discussion is an edited version of the morning and
afternoon panel discuss ion sessions.)
PANELISTS

Chairman:
Professor L.F .E. Goldie
Director, International Legal Studies
Program, Syracuse University College of Law
Mr. Michael Hardy, Esq.
Legal Advisor, United Nations, New York
Professor H. Gary Knight
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Dr. Fernando Labastida
Legal Officer, United Nations, New York
Dr. Gerard Mangone
Senior Fellow, W.oodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars
Commander William Palmer, U.S.N.
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington, D.C.
Professor Zdenek Slouka
Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars
The Chairman requested comments from the panel on the current
state of discussions on the development of international machinery to
regulate the uses of the deep seabed and the ocean floor. Noting that the
Soviet Union has shown little interest in international controls, he
asked if there was any ground for optimism for a global agreement.
Professor Slouka was "pessimistic" about prospects of a universal
agreement. Modern history knows no instances of global conventions
effectively allocating space and resources among nations. The rule of
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf defining the limits of
coastal control over the sea-bed was rendered obsolete and ineffective
by technology even before the treaty entered into force in 1964 for the
twenty-two ratifying states. Except for the general rule that the coastal
state has some exclusive rights over some portion of the adjacent seabed-a rule legally independent of the Convention-the Convention on
the Continental Shelf contains very little general accord on any concrete
points of the law of the sea-bed. However, regional regimes of the
continental shelf have emerged in the North Sea, in the Baltic Sea, in
the Adriatic, and in the Middle East Region; in the Asian
mediterranean area (Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia) still another

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol1/iss1/8

2

et al.: Panel Discussion

1972]

p ANEL

DISCUSSION

117

local system of order is also being developed on the basis of regional
needs and local perceptions of international law. This is a dominant
trend. While on the global level an international debate goes on, on the
lower, regional and local levels states act according to their diverse and
immediate needs. A related trend is characterized by national resort to
unilateral assertions of regulatory powt:~s extended into high sea areas
where such assertions are seen as defensible by some locally distinct
imperatives; the Canadian claim of a right to exercise extensive
pollution controls over shipping and other uses of the Arctic sea and its
seabed is an outstanding example.
Professor Knight was more optimistic. He considered the fact that
such issues as pollution, fishing rights and access to the sea-bed are so
pressing, that there will have to be a conference in the early 1970's that
will implement "hard" agreements by 1980.
Professor Slouka commented that the ratification process itself often
takes up to eight years. Even when the Continental Shelf Convention
finally received in 1964 the validating number of ratifications, it still
covered continental shelves adjacent to less than thirty percent of the
total sea coastline and did not apply to the majority of industrially
important parts of the shelf.
The Chairman emphasized the problem presented by the "special
interests" of States, citing the refusal of the German Federal Republic
to ratify the Continental Shelf Convention, because its own interests
would have been badly jeopardized. He suggested the possibility of
regional solutions within the framework of a universal or semiuniversal document which would give the regional settlement a
perspective and a frame of reference. Such a universal document would
be very important in resolving, for example, the volatile situation in the
North China Sea off Ryuku where there is one of the world's largest
submarine oil deposits, and Mainland China as well as Taiwan, Korea
and Japan all have claims.
Professor Knight, continuing his optimistic approach, pointed out
that if ten or fifteen of the technologically powerful nations, and those
with broad shelves, would commit themselves to an interim regime,
such as that proposed by President Nixon on May 23, 1970, and as has
been done in deep sea mining ventures, there would be some degree of
international accord until a universal agreement is made.
Mr. Hardy pointed out that an agreement, to be effective, would have
to be generally supported by countries holding different political views
and by both developed and developing countries.
There was a question from the floor asking what the special-interest
position was of the Chile, Ecuador and Peru countries regarding the
sea-bed, and what they have said in the United Nations.
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Professor Slouka responded that they would not oppose an
international sea-bed regime as long as it did not undermine their
exclusive fisheries claims and other assorted rights within the two
hundred mil e limits.
Dr. Labastida added that the Latin American countries favor a
comprehensive Law of the Sea conference, one that would largel :v
rewrite the Law of the Sea, including the regimes of the high seas, the
continental shelf, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, fishing rights,
and the prevention of pollution and scientific research.
Professor Slouka saw a reason for optimism in the possible impact of
the global debate on the policies of the maritime states whose
involvement in the ocean may make them more sensitive to outside
pressures. Once they realize that no timely and effective solution can be
had through the global policy-making process, they may start working
out local solutions broadly compatible with such general principles as
the global debate may help formulate and legitimize. He pointed to the
influence that the United Nations sea-bed debate had on the moulding
of the foreign policy of the United States concerning the regime of the
deep ocean floor as it has evolved from 1967 to President Nixon's May,
1970 proposals.
In a comment from the audience, Professor Weeks of the Syracuse
University College of Law introduced the Private International Law
viewpoint on the hostile commercial uses of the sea-bed. He suggested
that there may be commercial interests currently working very rapidly
to attempt to exploit the sea-bed before there is time for an
administrative regime to be established. He feared a kind of mootness
that a United Nations regime might be faced with if commercial
interests act first. The United Nations should structure a "halt" beforethe-fact kind of machinery.
The Chairman indicated that not all commercial enterprises are so
inclined, and some oppose the laissez-faire position of the National
Petroleum Council. For example, Mr. John Laylin, counsel for the
Kennicott Copper Corporation, advocates the establishment of an
international regime and international reciprocity.
In an additional comment, Professor Weeks asked if the copper
companies' stance might not result from their position of technological
superiority to the petroleum industry.
Mr. Hardy drew attention to the fact that the manganese nodules
(from which copper and other hard minerals can be derived) are widely
distributed over the ocean floor, while exploitable oil and gas deposits
are relatively close to the shore. Furthermore, whereas off-shore oil
production was now in the region of seventeen to eighteen per cent of
world production, a percentage which, though likely to increase, was
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not likely to change drastically, it might be possible, according to some
estimates, to meet a large amount of the world demand for the hard
minerals in question from exploitation of a relatively small area of the
ocean floor.
The Chairman agreed that the copper companies' motives are not
altruistic. He pointed out, however, that private international interests
do put strange bed-fellows together .
The Chairman then asked how far along we are towards at least some
kind of viable formulation from the Sea-Bed Committee of the United
Nations.
Mr. Hardy said that a beginning had been made and that individual
States were now at a stage where they were able to develop their own
positions, as distinct from sharing in a general regional viewpoint.
Further progress was 1ikely to proceed through three sub-committees:
one dealing with the future regime and machinery for the international
area of the sea-bed; one dealing with Law of the Sea issues; and one
dealing with marine pollution and scientific research. There were
various problems of co-ordination as regards other United Nation s
bodies (s uch as the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, for
example), dealing with the same- or related topics. In addition to the
United States proposal, Tanzania had submitted a draft treaty, and
others might be expected.
The Chairman asked Dr. Mangone for his views on regionalism and
universalism and what hopes there are for a common denominator.
Dr. Mangone replied that we must take into account the new
problems facing us. Some thirty to thirty-five States have alread:·•
permitted oil concessions beyond the two hundred meter isobath. We
must deal with the whole new thrust of pollution along with the
traditional questions of fisheries and zones. In addition, we have good
reason to believe that the Soviet Union and the United States are
examining so-called defensive weapons that can be put upon the sea-bed
to detect vessels that may be under water. Both have submarines that
can rest submerged at great depths for indefinite periods of time. This
is a "strategic element" of the pro bl em which was not foreseen just a
few years ago. Thus, the pollution element and the strategic element
must be added to fisheries and mineral resources issues to form a
problem whose solution will require the accommodation of the interests
of all the States. Professor Slouka's pessimistic view is certainh'
accurate if one is looking for a global settlement on all of these issues at
one time in the foreseeable future. But there are a broad range of
possible negotiations. Some regimes may be worked out earlier and
apart from others. The oil pollution regime, for example, may be the
first one to be settled through a global system of monitoring how much
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oil is being introduced into the oceans and by whom. Large and small
nations would need to work out terms of "what is it that we want to get
out as a common denominator of an international regime-what are
we prepared to trade off." This would mean increasing intention by
each State in its own national interest to find some means of
accommodation. For example, the United States might wish to use her
wealth of petroleum resources on an internationalized sea-bed as one of
her trade-offs for defense considerations in gaining a narrow territorial
sea. If Peru could be persuaded that she will have all the benefits of
exploiting fish off her coast, she might agree to restrain her claims to
wide territorial sea.
Commander Palmer thought the trade-off situation should not be
over-simplified, finding it difficult to see what a small territorial limit
would have to do with defense considerations.
Dr. Mangone compared the strategic element to chess: the object of
the narrow territorial sea is to preserve the mobility of a powerful
nation's fleet in moving around the oceans. The object is to keep the
marine environment as open as possible to international passage, not
hindered by wide territorial seas of coastal states.
Commander Palmer stated his question as the opposite of that: what
is the relevance, from the standpoint of a coastal State's security, of a
broader territorial sea, given the range of submarine missiles?
Dr. Labastida pointed out that many developing countries favor a
wider territorial sea to prevent military and scientific research by the
big powers, giving the big powers added advantage over them.
Professor Slouka turned again to the pollution issue, pointing out the
difficulty of getting treaties negotiated in a global forum and ratified on
a global scale. The developing states would often find it impossible to
accept anti-pollution agreements obligating them to build expensive
shore installations for the disposal of oil wastes, or to equip their ships
with costly anti-pollution equipment. Under such agreements, and
without particular adjustments responding to the international
economic asymmetries, the developing states would no longer be able to
buy and operate older ships which often form the nucleus of their young
merchant marine. A solution will have to be sought gradually with antipollution standards adjusted to the geographical setting and other
environmental factors as well as to the economic conditions of the
individual states. This would then be an added pressure towards the
emergence oi diverse local systems, often primitive, struggling and far
from ideal; just as in the case of the sea-bed regime, here too impulses
toward an early and easy establishment of a rational and uniform
global system of control are lacking.
Mr. Hardy said that suggestions had been made that the richer States
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should aid the poorer ones in the event that anti-pollution measures
were proposed requiring expensive technology. He also pointed out the
difficulties involved in enforcing compliance with pollutfon regulations.
In the case of fishing zones, fishing vessels can, up to a point, be stopped
and inspected; the creation of anti-pollution zones or restrictions,
potentially applicable as regards all vessels, including warships, raised
more difficult problems as regards enforcement.
The Chairman thanked the participants for their valuable
contributions to clarifying thought on the problems of "ocean space" or
"inner space" not only for Syracuse and the people at the Regional
Meeting, but also for the wider audience whom, so he hoped, the
published version of these proceedings would reach.
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